Abstract-The principal mission of Group Testing (GT) is to identify a small subset of "defective" items from a large population, by grouping items into as little as possible test pools. The test outcome of a pool is positive if it contains at least one defective item, and is negative otherwise. GT algorithms are utilized in numerous applications, and in most of them the privacy of the tested subjects, namely, whether they are defective or not, is critical.
I. INTRODUCTION
The classical version of Group Testing (GT) was suggested during WWII in order to identify syphilis infected draftees [1] while dramatically reducing the number of required assays. Specifically, when the number of infected draftees is much smaller than the population size (all combatants), instead of examining each blood sample individually, which requires a lot of resources and is not cost effective, they conducted a small number of assays of pooled samples. Consequently, each pool outcome result is negative if it contains no infected samples, and positive if it contains at least one infected sample. The problem is thus to identify the infected samples via as few pooled tests as possible. Formally, the GT objective is in identifying a small unknown subset K of defective items from a much larger set N , conducting as few measurements T as possible.
Since its exploitation during WWII, GT has been utilized in many fields such as biology, chemistry, data forensics and many more, under various modifications (a survey can be found in [2] ). GT is widely utilized also in communication. For example, GT can be utilized as a conflict resolution protocol in multiple access communication (MAC), where multiple users share a common channel and are prone to collisions (e.g., [3] , [4] ). The GT concept was exploited by [5] in wireless sensor networks (WSN) in order to extract sensed data from the sensors and deliver it to a sink. The authors in [6] utilized GT for synchronous Gaussian Code-Division Multiple-Access Channels (CDMA).
Many applications, including some of the examples presented above, which utilize GT, include sensitive information that is confidential, and is intended only to the designated participants, hence needs to be secured. However, it is important
The authors are with the Department of Communication Systems Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel (e-mail: alejandr@post.bgu.ac.il; coasaf@post.bgu.ac.il; gurewitz@post.bgu.ac.il). to note that in GT, a leakage of even a single pool-test result contains significant information on the tested items, hence is hard to secure. I.e., a negative result indicates that none of the items tested in the pool are defective and a positive result indicates that at least one of the items in the pool is defective. Accordingly, in such GT applications, ensuring that a leakage of a fraction of the pool test outcomes to undesirable or malicious eavesdroppers does not give them any useful information on the status of the items is crucial.
While the current literature includes several works on the privacy in GT algorithms for digital objects (e.g., [7] ), these works are based on cryptographic schemes, thus ensuing a high computational burden. More importantly, cryptographic schemes using, for example, public-key or additively homomorphic encryption are based on the assumption that the computational power of the eavesdropper is limited. Information theoretic security, on the other hand, offers privacy at the price of rate [8] , or, in this case, additional tests.
Main Contribution
In this work, we suggest a new SGT algorithm based on information theoretic principles. In the considered model, there is an eavesdropper which may observe part of the information from the outcome pool-tests vector. The goal of the test designer is to design the tests such that as long as the eavesdropper gains only partial information from the output vector, the eavesdropper cannot (asymptotically) gain significant information on the status of the items (defective or not). Accordingly, we propose a SGT algorithm which satisfies reliability as well as a weak secrecy condition. We further provide bounds on the number of tests required in the SGT model to be sufficient for the legitimate user to identify the defective items yet keep the eavesdropper ignorant regarding any of the items.
We do so by proposing a model, which is, in a sense, analogous to a channel model, as depicted in Figure 1 . The subset of indices pointing to the (in hindsight) defective items in this analogy takes the place of a confidential message; the testing matrix represents the design of the pools: a matrix row can be considered as codeword, where each row corresponds to a separate item. The decoding algorithm is analogous to a channel decoding process, and the eavesdropped signal is the output of an erasure channel, namely, having only part of the transmitted signal from the legitimate source to the legitimate receiver.
In our algorithm, instead of each item receiving a single test vector which determines exclusively in which pool-tests it should participate, each item receives a random vector, chosen from a set of random and independent vectors. The vectors are, in a sense, dissimilar when the number of tests is large. Namely, we use stochastic encoding, and each vector determines different pool-tests in which the item should participate. For each item the lab picks one of the vectors in its set at random, and the item participates in the pool-tests according to this randomly chosen vector. A schematic description of our procedure is depicted in Figure 3 . It is important to note, though, that the randomness is required only at the lab (the "mixer"), and it is not a shared key in any sense.
Accordingly, by obtaining a pool-test result, without knowing the specific vectors chosen by the lab for each item, the eavesdropper may gain only negligible information regarding the items themselves. Specifically, we show that even though the pool-tests in which each item participated can be chosen randomly and even though the legitimate user does not know a-priori in which pool-tests each item has participated, the legitimate user will be able to identify the defective items, while the eavesdropper, observing only a subset of the pooltest results, will have no significant information regarding the status of the items.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In SGT, a legitimate user desires to identify a small unknown subset K of defective items form a larger set N , while reducing the number of measurements T as possible and keeping the eavesdropper, which is able to observe a subset of the tests results, ignorant regarding the status of the N items. N = |N |, K = |K| denote the total number of items, and the number of defective items, respectively. The status of the items, defective or not, should be kept secure from the eavesdropper, but detectable to the legitimate user. We assume that the number K of defective items in K is known a priori. This is a common assumption in the GT literature [9] .
Throughout the paper, we use boldface to denote matrices, capital letters to denote random variables, lower case letters to denote their realizations, and calligraphic letters to denote the alphabet. Logarithms are in base 2 and h b (·) denotes the binary entropy function. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the model. In general, and regardless of security constraints, GT is defined by a testing matrix X = [X
N ×T , where each row corresponds to a separate item j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and each column corresponds to a separate pool test t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. For the j-th item, X T j = {X j (1), . . . , X j (T )} is a binary row vector, with the t-th entry X j (t) = 1 if and only if item j participates in the t-th test. In this paper, to address the secrecy constraint, X will be a randomized testing matrix, as will be explained in the sequel.
If A j ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function for the j-th item, determining whether it belongs to the defective set, i.e., Figure 2 : Noiseless non-adaptive secure group-testing setup.
where is used to denote the boolean OR operation, and the second equality is since only the defective items will have influence in the boolean operation on the outcome vector.
In SGT, we assume an eavesdropper which observes a noisy vector Z T = {Z (1), . . . , Z(T )}, generated from the outcome vector Y T . In the erasure case considered in the work, the probability of erasure is 1 − δ, i.i.d. for each test. That is, on average, T δ outcomes are not erased and are accessible to the eavesdropper via Z T . Therefore, in the erasure case, if B t ∈ {1, ?} is an erasure indicator function for the t-th pool test, i.e., B t = 1 with probability δ, and B t =? with probability 1 − δ, the eavesdropper observes
Denote by W ∈ {1, . . . , N K } the index of the subset of defective items. We assume W is uniformly distributed, that is, there is no a-priori bias to any specific subset. Further, denote byŴ (Y T ) the index recovered by the legitimate decoder, after observing Y T . We refer to the testing matrix, together with the decoder as a SGT algorithm. As we are interested in the asymptotic behavior, the following definition lays out the goals of SGT algorithm. To conclude, The goal is to design (for parameters N and K) an N × T measurement matrix and a decoding algorithm W (Y T ), such that observing Y T , the legitimate user will identify the subset of defective items (with high probability), yet, observing Z T , the eavesdropper cannot (asymptotically) identify the status of the items, defective or not.
III. RELATED WORK A GT model was first introduced in a landmark work [1] by Dorfman in the 1940s. This model was considered in many works as a combinatorial problem, where the papers provided efficient algorithms and bounds on the minimum number of group tests required. One setting is where the entire pooling strategy is decided on beforehand, called Non-Adaptive GT [2] , [10] . The other is where the outcomes of previous tests can be used to influence the makeup of future pools, called Adaptive GT [11] . Anther aspect of the problem is whether the result of each test is noiseless or noisy, namely, where possible errors occur in the pool testing [12] .
The bounds available in the literature on the number of tests required to identify all the defective items in noiseless GT, are T = Θ(K log N ). See, e.g., [12] . In fact, it is exactly K log N in the simple Boolean scenario. The bounds on the number of tests required in the noisy scenario are, in general, a constant factor larger than the noiseless scenario [13] .
Group Testing as a Channel Coding Problem
Recent papers [12] , [14] , [15] adopted an information theoretic perspective on GT, presenting it as a channel coding/decoding problem. Since we also adopt this perspective, we briefly review the main results in this setting.
In [12] , [16] , the authors mapped the GT model to an equivalent channel model, where the defective set takes the place of the message, the testing matrix rows are codewords, and the test outcomes are the received signal. They letŜ(X T , Y T ) denote the estimate of the defective subset S, which is random due to the randomness in X and Y . Furthermore, let P e denote the average probability of error, averaged over all subsets S of cardinality K, variables X T and outcomes Y T , i.e., P e = P r[Ŝ(X T , Y T ) = S]. Then, the flowing bound on the total number of tests required in Bernoulli GT was given.
Theorem 1 ( [12], [16]). Let T in a GT model be the minimum number of tests necessary to identify the defective set S of cardinality
as N → ∞, the average error probability approaches zero. (S 1 , S 2 ) denote the partition of defective set S into disjoint sets S 1 and S 2 with cardinalities i and K − i, respectively and ε ≥ 0 is an arbitrarily small constant independent of N and K.
In [14] , using a similar analogy to adaptive GT, the authors defined the GT rate R as log 2 N K /T and introduced the capacity C, that is, if for any ε > 0, there exists a sequence of algorithms with lim N →∞ log 2 N K /T ≤ C − ε and success probability approaching one, yet with lim N →∞ log 2 N K /T > C it approaches zero.
However, non of the aforementioned works considered security aspects of GT, such as the possible leakage of pool test to untrusted eavesdropper.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Under the model definition given in Section II, our main result is the following sufficiency (direct) condition, characterizing the maximal number of tests required to guarantee both reliability and security.
Theorem 2. Assume a SGT model with N items, out of which
for some ε ≥ 0 independent of N and K, then there exists a sequence of SGT algorithm which are reliable and weakly secure. That is, as N → ∞, both the average error probability approaches zero and an eavesdropper with leakage probability δ is kept ignorant.
The construction of the SGT algorithm, together with the proofs of reliability and secrecy are deferred to Section V. However, a few important remarks are in order now.
First, rearranging terms in eq. (1), we have
That is, compared to only a reliability constraint, the number of tests required for both reliability and secrecy is increased by the multiplicative factor 1 1−δ , where, again, δ is the leakage probability at the eavesdropper.
Since for a fixed K and large enough N we have log
we have the following corollary on the number of tests required.
Corollary 1. For SGT with parameters K << N and T , reliability and weak secrecy can be maintained with
Note that this suggests a Θ (K log N ) result for δ bounded away from 1. A more detailed explanation of this result, together with proofs and elaborations appears in [17] .
A. Secrecy capacity in SGT
Returning to the analogy in [14] between channel capacity and group testing, one might define by C s the (asymptotic) minimal threshold value for log N K /T , above which no reliable and secure scheme is possible. Under this definition, the result in this paper show that C s ≥ (1 − δ)C, where C is the capacity without the security constraint. Clearly, this can be written as C s ≥ C − δC, raising the usual interpretation as the difference between the capacity to the legitimate decoder and that to the eavesdropper [8] . Note that as the effective number of tests Eve sees is T e = δT , hence her GT capacity is δC.
V. CODE CONSTRUCTION AND A PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
In order to keep the eavesdropper, which obtains only a fraction δ of the outcomes, ignorant regarding the status of the items, we randomly map the items to the tests. Specifically, as depicted in Figure 3 , for each item we generate a bin, 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory containing several rows. The number of such rows corresponds to the number of tests that the eavesdropper can obtain, yet, unlike wiretap channels, it is not identical to Eve's capacity, and should be normalized by the number of defective items. Then, for the j-th item, we randomly select a row from the j-th bin. This row will determine in which tests the item will participate. In order to rigorously describe the construction of the matrices and bins, determine the exact values of the parameters (e.g., bin size), and analyze the reliability and secrecy, we first briefly review the representation of the GT problem as a channel coding problem [12] , together with the components required for SGT.
A SGT code consists of an index set I = {1, 2, . . . N K }, its w-th item corresponding to the w-th subset K ⊂ {1, . . . , N }; A discrete memoryless source of randomness (R, p R ), with known alphabet R and known statistics p R ; An encoder, f : I × R → X Sw ∈ {0, 1}
K×T which maps the index W of the defective items to a matrix X T Sw of codewords, each of its rows corresponding to a different item in the index set S w . The need for a stochastic encoder is similar to most encoders ensuring information theoretic security, as randomness is required to confuse the eavesdropper about the actual information [8] . Hence, we define by R K the random variable encompassing the randomness required for the K defective items, and by M the number of rows in each bin.
At this point, and important clarification is in order. The lab, of course, does not know which items are defective. Thus, operationally, it needs to select a row for each item. However, in the analysis, since only the defective items affect the output (that is, only their rows are summed up to give Y T ), we refer to the "message" as the index of the defective set w and refer only to the random variable R K required to choose the rows in their bins.
A decoder at the legitimate user is a mapŴ : Y T → I. The probability of error is P (Ŵ (Y T ) = W ). The probability that an outcome test leaks to the eavesdropper is δ. We assume a memoryless model, i.e., each outcome Y (t) depends only on the corresponding input X Sw (t), and the eavesdropper observes Z(t), generated from
We may now turn to the detailed construction and analysis.
1) Codebook Generation
, for each item generate M independent and identically distributed codewords x T (m), 1 ≤ m ≤ M , where ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. The codebook is depicted in the left hand side of Figure 3 . Reveal the codebook to Alice and Bob. We assume Eve may have the codebook as well.
2) Tesing: For each item j, the lab selects uniformly at random one codeword x T (m) from the j-th bin. Therefore, the SGT matrix contains N randomly selected codewords of length T , one for each item, defective or not. Amongst is an unknown subset X T Sw , with the index w representing the true defective. An entry of the j-th random codeword is 1 if the j-item is a member of the designated pool test and 0 otherwise.
3) Decoding at the Legitimate Receiver: The decoder looks for a collection of K codewords X T Sŵ , one from each bin, for which Y T is most likely. Namely,
as the set of bins in which the rowsŵ reside.
A. Reliability
Let (S 1 , S 2 ) denote a partition of the defective set S into disjoint sets S 1 and S 2 , with cardinalities i and K − i, respectively. Let I(X S 1 ; X S 2 , Y ) denote the mutual information between X S 1 and X S 2 , Y , under the i.i.d. distribution with which the codebook was generated and remembering that Y is the output of a Boolean channel. The following lemma is a key step in proving the reliability of the decoding algorithm.
Lemma 1. If the number of tests satisfies
then, under the codebook above, as N → ∞ the average error probability approaches zero.
Proof Sketch. The proof is technical, and cannot fit the scope of this extended abstract. However, in short, it extends the results in [12] to the codebook required for SGT. Specifically, to obtain a bound on the required number of tests, we analyze the error probability of the ML decoder using a Gallager-type bound [18] . Similar to [16] , we define the error event E i as the event of mistaking the true set for a set which differs from it in exactly i variables. We have,
Note that there are two main differences compared to non-secured GT. First, the decoder has M i subsets to confuse the decoder. However, due to the bin structure of the code, there are also many "wrong" subsets which, although not being the one transmitted on the channel, do not create an error event, as the actual bin decoded may still be the right one. Now, following the detailed analysis in [12] , for any fixed K and N → ∞, T ≥ (1+ε)· log (
I(X S 1 ;X S 2 ,Y ) is sufficient to ensure an arbitrarily small error probability P (E i ), and using a simple union bound one easily observes that taking the maximum over i will ensure a small error probability in total.
We now investigate I(X S 1 ; X S 2 , Y ). K ) i ). Then, it is easy to verify that the bounds meet at the two endpoint of i = 1 and i = K, yet the mutual information is concave in i.
Applying Claim 1 to the expression in Lemma 1, we have
Hence, substituting M = 2 Noting that this is for large K and N , and that ε is independent of them, achieves the bound on T provided in
